When used to examine disin ‡ation monetary policies, the current workhorse dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of business cycle ‡uctuations is able to quantitatively account for the main stylized facts in terms of recessionary e¤ects and sacri…ce ratio. We complement the transitional analysis of the short-run costs with a rigorous welfare evaluation and show that, despite the long-lasting economic downturn, disin ‡ation entails non-zero overall welfare gains.
was among the …rst to point out this inconsistency of standard sticky price models, in which a disin ‡ation could be followed by a boom rather than a slump (see also Burstein, 2006) . In fact, in a subsequent paper, Ball (1995) introduces imperfect credibility as a necessary device to explain the observed output costs of a disin ‡ationary policy. More recently, Erceg and Levin (2003) and Goodfriend and King (2005) introduce imperfect credibility in a standard New Keynesian model to explain the famous Volcker disin ‡a-tion (see also Nicolae and Nolan, 2006) . Mankiw (2001) also forcefully expresses the view that standard sticky price models cannot deliver in ‡ation persistence and thus justify the costs of disin ‡ation. Indeed, this drawback was one of the main reason that led Mankiw and Reis (2002) to propose a di¤erent model of price stickiness based on sticky information. The literature can then rationalize output costs of a disin ‡ation by appealing to some form of imperfect credibility/information/rationality. It is however less conclusive on the size of the recession following a disin ‡ation episodes.
The aim of this work is to give a quantitative assessment of the ability of the New Keynesian framework to match the stylized fact after a disin ‡ation. In order to do that we need an operational model of business cycle ‡uctuations. In their seminal work, Christiano et al. (2005) (CEE, henceforth) show that a medium-scale New Keynesian model, enlarged to accommodate various nominal and real frictions, matched the business cycle ‡uctuations reasonably well. This model (or some slightly modi…ed versions of it) has been widely and successfully employed both in empirical work (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, Altig et al., 2004, ) and in normative analysis (e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2005) . Surprisingly, however, up to now no one has assessed the ability of the CEE model to quantitatively account for the costs of disin ‡ation, and to address the issue of disin ‡ation from a welfare perspective. This is what we do in this paper. We address two questions:
1. How successful is the current operational New Keynesian DSGE model of the business cycle at quantitatively replicating the empirical costs of disin ‡ation and sacri…ce ratio, without resorting to some form of imperfect credibility, imperfect information or irrationality in expectations? 2. How costly is a credible disin ‡ation in terms of welfare?
Moreover, in oder to tiyng our hand as much as possible in aswering these questions, we deliberately restrain ourselves from changing any of the features of our reference model and the structural parameters values, as estimated or calibrated by CEE.
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The answer to the …rst question is: quite successful. The simulation of the model indicates that a credible disin ‡ation leads to a prolonged decline in output, and that the value of the sacri…ce ratio is in line with the available empirical evidence.
With regards to the second question, we work out a rigorous welfare evaluation of the costs of a disin ‡ation, constructing a welfare-based sacri…ce ratio. Interestingly, despite the prolonged slump in output, we show that a disin ‡ation implies welfare gains. The size of these gains is very small: equal to a permanent increase in initial steady state consumption of 0.06-0.07% each period per each point of diminished in ‡ation. More precisely, small long-run gains outweigh even smaller short-run costs. Surprisingly enough, the short run costs of a disin ‡ation are negligible, despite the transitional economic downturn.
Finally, we want to raise a methodological consideration. In contrast with the standard practice in the literature of approximating the model structural equations, here we simulate numerically the original non-linear model. In our view this is crucial, because taking linear or log-linear approximations may rule out some important transmission mechanisms. Yun (2005) , for instance, emphasizes the role of relative price dispersion, often neglected in linear models, in driving his results for optimal monetary policy. Also, money is non-superneutral in the CEE model. Ascari and Merkl (2007) shows that the use of log-linear approximations to study a disin ‡ation may yield misleading results, since a disin ‡ation implies a movement from one steady state to another one. 1 A companion paper thoroughly analyzes how the di¤erent features of the CEE model, the parameter values and the monetary policy rule a¤ect the costs of disin ‡ation. For obvious length constraints, this kind of analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
An operational model of the business cycle
To study the e¤ects of disin ‡ationary monetary policy we rely on the operational medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model developed in CEE and then used, among others, in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Uribe (2005, 2007) . In this section we discuss some key features of the model. A brief description of the structural equations and parameters calibration are given in the Appendix.
The model features both real and nominal frictions, which are deemed to be crucial to replicate the dynamic properties of the business cycle (see CEE for the United States and Smets and Wouters, 2003 , for the euro area). Real frictions include: monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, internal habit in consumption, variable capital utilization and adjustment costs in investment decisions. As for nominal frictions: prices and wages are sticky à la Calvo, with an indexation clause. In particular, in each period only a fraction of prices and wages are set optimally; prices and wages that cannot be reoptimized are automatically adjusted to keep up with the in ‡ation rate recorded in previous period. Finally, money balances enter the model in two ways: households derive direct utility from holding real money balances (assumption of money-in-theutility function) and entrepreneurs must hold nominal money balances to pay wages before production (assumption of cash-in-advance).
We depart from our reference models with regards to monetary policy. We assume the central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate, i t , according to the non-linear rule de…ned by
where t , and i represent the in ‡ation rate, the in ‡ation target and the nominal interest rate target, respectively. Notice, from the standard consumption Euler equation, it must hold that 1 + i = (1 + ) = , where is the representative household's subjective discount factor.
Two distinct features of (1) are worth stressing. First, our postulated nominal interest rate targeting rule does not respond to the output gap. The reason for this choice is the following. We think that a credible cold-turkey disin ‡ation and countercyclical monetary policy behavior cannot coexist: after a permanent reduction in the in ‡ation target, any attempt to soften the output decline at the expense of higher in ‡ation may call the monetary authority's credibility to curb in ‡ation into questions. Second, our postulated nominal interest rate rule lacks an inertial term. Again, we think that the central bank's attitude should be history independent. Especially at the time the disin‡ation is implemented, the short-term nominal interest rate should be adjusted freely in the light of the new, lower in ‡ation target. In sum, we envisage the disin ‡ation period as a temporary pure in ‡ation targeting regime, where the dominant concern for monetary policy is to bring down in ‡ation.
Before analyzing the costs of disin ‡ation, it is important to highlight two points.
The …rst has to do with the deterministic steady state relationship between output and in ‡ation. Although the degree of indexation in prices and wages is calibrated equal to one, money is non-superneutral. This is due to the cash-in-advance constraint on intermediate …rms to pay wage bill. As illustrated in CEE, in this case the real marginal cost schedule depends on the nominal interest rate. Although this hypothesis is important to match the empirical impulse response functions and the overall short-run dynamics, it also a¤ects the deterministic steady state. Even with full price and wage indexation, positive trend in ‡ation yields real output cost. The higher the level of trend in ‡ation, the higher the labor costs for …rms, and, ceteris paribus, the lower the wage paid to workers. In response, households reduce their labor supply and employment falls.
Firms in turn decrease their capital stock, because labor and capital are complements in the production function. Eventually, the level of output decreases. The long-run Phillips Curve is not vertical. 2 Given CEE calibration, these e¤ects are rather minor:
a permanent 1% reduction in in ‡ation implies roughly a 0.1% increase in steady state output. 2 From an empirical point of view, it has been di¢ cult to tackle this issue within the VAR literature as the Blanchard and Quah (1989) restriction, i.e. no long-run e¤ects of aggregate demand shock on output, is typically used as an identifying restriction (see, for example, Cecchetti and Rich, 2001 ).
However, when this restriction is not imposed, it does not follow automatically that output goes back exactly to its initial level (see Collard et al. 2006 , Fève et al., 2007 . 3 It is important to stress that the assumption of full indexation of prices and wages rules out potential
The second point we want to draw attention to is methodological and concerns E¤ectively, our disin ‡ation experiment entails a transition between two steady states in a perfect foresight, non-linear model.
As regards the new in ‡ation target we consider three cases: new = f0%; 1%; 2%g.
Disin ‡ations aimed at achieving an in ‡ation target of 1-2% are interesting for at least two reasons. Such targets come near to the actual in ‡ation objectives at work in many real e¤ects arising from nominal rigidities. It is well-known that a positive steady state in ‡ation rate increases steady state price and wage dispersion in the absence of full indexation, yielding an ine¢ ciency loss on aggregate production (e.g., Ascari, 2004 , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2005 , Yun, 2005 . In other words, with partial wage and/or price indexation the real e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation, and thus also the e¤ects on welfare, would be much larger. 4 For further details on DYNARE see the webpage: http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
central banks, e.g., the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. 5 Furthermore, an in ‡ation target of 2% is not far from the recent estimates of US Federal Reserve's implicit in ‡ation target. 6 Instead, the reason for studying cold-turkey disin ‡ations aimed at achieving full price stability,
i.e., new = 0, is more theory-based, as the recent literature on optimal monetary policy has thoroughly explained the reasons why full price stability is socially desirable (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003) . Finally, we present results both for = 1:5 and = 3. Just before the current economic crisis, the monetary policy problem in the EU was to realign in ‡ation to the target, after the surge in oil, energy and food prices. 8 Clearly, the same reasoning also applies to wage setters' behavior. Here, however, we primarily comment on intermediate …rms'behavior and in ‡ation dynamics. in ‡ation rate. As a matter of fact, they increase their prices by 1 + old . As shown in Figure 1 , of these two con ‡icting pricing decisions the latter prevails. The aggregate price index continues to rise but at a slower rate. Thus, in ‡ation rate decelerates.
As in ‡ation does not immediately adjust to the new target, the central bank responds to the positive in ‡ation gap ( 1 new ) with a monetary policy contraction. The central bank temporarily increases the policy rate, even though disin ‡ation implies a lower steady state nominal interest rate. The follow-on rise of real interest rate reduce the aggregate demand: households postpone consumption and decrease investment spending. Furthermore, higher nominal interest rate increases intermediate …rms'costs via the cash-in-advance constraint. Real wage drops, households supply less labor and intermediate …rms reduce the rate of capital utilization. Taken as a whole, the level of output falls. In successive periods, the in ‡ation rate continues to adjust towards the new lower target, while the central bank starts cutting the nominal interest rate.
Nonetheless, the real interest rate remains above steady state for several quarters. The economy enters a recession and the level of output hits bottom in the second quarter.
Ultimately, the economy is successfully disin ‡ated in about 15 quarters. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of output, in ‡ation, and nominal and real interest rates after cold-turkey disin ‡ations aimed at achieving new = 2%, when = 3. The e¤ects of having a more hawkish central bank are intuitive. In general, the monetary policy is more restrictive (see the large increase in the nominal interest rate) and the output downturn more severe (see Table 1 ). Nevertheless, adjusting …rms seems to behave much the same as in previous case (when = 1:5). As a matter of fact, the adjustment path of in ‡ation is surprisingly similar to the top-right panel in Figure 1 . There is just a small di¤erence in terms of adjustment speed: with = 3, the cold-turkey disin ‡ation is accomplished in about 12 quarters.
We have seen that cold-turkey disin ‡ations produce signi…cant recessions, but how large are these short-run output costs? To answer this question we borrow directly from the empirical literature on disin ‡ation and de…ne a model-consistent sacri…ce ratio. In particular,
where Y new represents the steady state level of output at new . Thus, our measure indicates the cumulative percentage output loss the economy has to incur in order to achieve a 1% permanent reduction of steady state in ‡ation. Two features of (2) are worth noticing. First, we de…ne the sacri…ce ratio by calculating the output loss in deviation from the new steady state. Second, we sum up the percentage output losses over the …rst T periods. In particular, the value of T is chosen to re ‡ect the number of periods in ‡ation takes to converge to the new in ‡ation target. Table 1 reports values of the model-consistent sacri…ce ratios calculated both for = 1:5 (and T = 15) and = 3 (and T = 12). We note …rst of all that the theoretical sacri…ce ratios are positive and in line with the existing empirical estimates (see the Introduction). In particular, the sacri…ce ratio turns out to be approximately 1:05 when = 1:5; whereas it takes up a slightly larger value, 1:62, when the central bank is relatively more concerned with in ‡ation stabilization around the target, i.e., when = 3. In fact, we have seen that in this case the ensuing recession is more severe.
However, the size of disin ‡ation does not seem to a¤ect the sacri…ce ratio. Varying the size of disin ‡ation leads to a roughly proportional rescaling of output transition paths and this leaves the sacri…ce ratio practically unchanged.
In summary, in the medium-scale operational New Keynesian DSGE model a coldturkey permanent reduction in trend in ‡ation entails sizable short-run output costs.
To bring down trend in ‡ation, say, from 4 to 2%, by means of a credible cold-turkey disin ‡ation the economy would have to incur a cumulative output loss of either 2.1 or 3.2%, depending on the type of interest rate rule. The in ‡ation adjustment would then be completed in about 4 or 3 years.
4 A welfare-based measure of the cost of disin ‡ation
As already noted in Gordon and King (1982) focussing on an empirical one such as the sacri…ce ratio.
Mimicking the construction of the sacri…ce ratio, a measure of the welfare loss caused by disin ‡ation can be calculated as the di¤erence between the value function at time zero, V 0 (when the disin ‡ation is actually implemented), and the value function at the initial steady state in ‡ation, V old (as if the disin ‡ation was not implemented). More formally, our welfare-based sacri…ce ratio can be de…ned as
Notice that V 0 represents the discounted sum of future stream of instantaneous utility as such it measures both the transition dynamics and the long-run e¤ects of the disin ‡ation.
Paralleling the standard sacri…ce ratio de…nition, WSR> 0, if V 0 V old < 0. That is, the welfare-based sacri…ce ratio is positive if the disin ‡ation reduces welfare .
The consumption equivalent measure
A policy maker is interested in the welfare cost of implementing a disin ‡ationary policy, but given that the utility function is not cardinal, a measure based on the value function is not very revealing. The di¤erence (V 0 V old ) needs to be converted into consumption equivalent units. The consumption equivalent measure de…nes the constant fraction of consumption that households have to give up in each period in the starting steady state, to reach the value function that would obtain if the disin ‡ation is implemented. Thus, it measures how much households have to su¤er in terms of consumption loss, in order to reduce the in ‡ation rate permanently by a certain amount.
The derivation of the welfare-based measure in terms of consumption equivalent units is straightforward. The initial value function, in case the central bank does not disin ‡ate the economy and keeps in ‡ation target permanently at old , is given by
where c old , h old and m h old denote respectively consumption, hours worked and real money balances held by households in the initial steady state; 0 and m are structural parameters.
11 Given the value of V 0 , available from the numerical solution of the model, we then have to …nd the constant fraction of steady state consumption, i.e., , that solves the following equation
Thus, the consumption equivalent measure is given by
Finally, our proposed welfare-based sacri…ce ratio is obtained as
11 See the Appendix for further details. 12 Note that there is no minus in front of this ratio, to maintain a positive sign for a loss. Indeed, if V 0 -V old < 0, that is, if disin ‡ation brings about a welfare loss, then > 0; and vice versa.
The …rst column of Therefore, when discussing the e¤ects of disin ‡ation policies it would be more appropriate to use the notion of welfare gain ratio rather than sacri…ce ratio, as in the empirical literature. We think this is a novel and interesting result. The empirical literature on disin ‡ation focuses only on the short-run costs in terms of output (or unemployment), but neglects any long-run gain. We show, on the contrary, that in a medium-scale DSGE monetary model of the business cycle a disin ‡ationary policy is welfare improving.
Moreover, note that the welfare gain from disin ‡ating: (i) decreases with the size of the disin ‡ation; and (ii) decreases with the starting level of in ‡ation, for a given size of disin ‡ation.
A second notable result from Table 2 is:
Result 2. The size of SR W , however, is small: the welfare gain is equivalent to an extra 0.06% of consumption each period.
Actually, the results are possibly even more striking, if we disentangle the short-run welfare costs of a disin ‡ation during the transition dynamics and the long-run welfare gains stemming from greater price stability. In fact, in the standard medium-scale DSGE macro model, even though a disin ‡ation entails a deep and prolonged recession, whose implied sacri…ce ratio is in line with the empirical evidence, the short-run welfare costs of such a painful adjustment path are plainly insigni…cant. 13 This result does not depend on the inclusion of real money balances in the utility function. We also calculated a similar measure without taking into account the gain in utility coming from the increase in real money balances in the new steady state. The measure would then be about 2/3 of the values reported in Table 2 : Welfare-based sacri…ce ratios.
To show this, we follow the same line of reasoning above and de…ne:
(i) the long-run costs in terms of consumption equivalent units:
where V new and V old denote the value function in the new and old in ‡ation steady states.
The above indicator can be expressed per unit of diminished in ‡ation to yield a long-run welfare-based sacri…ce ratio:
14 Note that we use a consistent de…nition as above for SR W 1 . In fact, if V new -V old < 0 (that is, if disin ‡ation brings about a welfare loss) then > 0; and vice versa.
(ii) the short-run welfare-based sacri…ce ratio is then given by
Table 2 reports the long-run welfare gains and the short-run welfare costs in consumption equivalent units for various disin ‡ation experiments. The order of magnitude of the short-run welfare costs is roughly 0.008-0.009% of initial consumption. Therefore, the long-run gains quantitatively dominate, though they too are very small (roughly 0.07%). The main message from Table 2 is that a disin ‡ation is going to be welfare improving of the order of an increase of initial consumption of 0.06-0.07% each period per point of diminished in ‡ation. That is, the welfare e¤ects of a disin ‡ation are scarcely signi…cant, despite high short-run costs in terms of output losses.
This stands in sharp contrast with the consensus view of the e¤ects of a credible disin ‡ation. What is the intuition for these results? To illustrate this point, let us consider the case with = 3. Figure 3 displays the paths of consumption and employment, expressed in deviation from the new steady state, together with value of the utility function. The disin ‡ation induces a prolonged recession that causes both consumption and employment to be below their new (and higher) steady state values for some periods.
Consumption and employment, however, have opposite e¤ects on the utility function of the representative agent. It follows that the net e¤ects of the recession on the utility of the representative agent is ambiguous. The decrease in consumption dominates in the impact period, dragging the utility function down, from the second period on the e¤ects of the dynamics of employment take over, and the utility function is above its new higher long-run value. Moreover, it will stay there for all the remaining periods of the recession. This is because the drop in employment is bigger in percentage terms, and slightly more sluggish. It follows that the positive impact of employment is quite e¤ective in counterbalancing the negative e¤ect of lower consumption. Overall, the transition entails a short-run cost, as shown above, but of a negligible order of magnitude.
Finally, the value of the utility function without counting the real money balances term is also depicted in Figure 3 , to clarify that the role of the real money balances term in the utility function in the above results is nil. This result obviously hinges on the representative agent assumption, that is, on complete markets and risk-sharing. The welfare analysis based on a representative agent framework cannot take into account, for example, the fact that some people may su¤er a very big drop in utility during recessions because they lose their jobs and do not have access to …nancial markets. This heterogeneity and composition e¤ect is missing by construction. However, we believe our results have two notable interpretations. First, taken at face value, our …ndings simply show that disin ‡ations, in particular, and recessions, in general, could be less of a problem than is normally thought, if the economy could provide an e¢ cient risk-sharing mechanism among agents (by means of capital markets or some public welfare system). In this sense, this is once again the Lucas'negligible costs of business cycle result. Second, if one is skeptical about the actual relevance of the welfare outcomes, then, at the very least, our results cast serious doubts on using these DSGE models for welfare evaluation without "inspecting the mechanism". In particular, the whole literature on optimal policy problems or on the ranking of di¤erent monetary policy rules is bound to be based on mechanism similar to the ours.
Conclusions
Disin ‡ation is an important topic in monetary economics and the subject of a vast literature. However, there is a widespread consensus that the New Keynesian models cannot explain the cost of disin ‡ation observed in the data, for which they need to resort to lack of credibility or information.
The logic of the policy experiments laid out in this paper is clear. We investigate whether the workhorse DSGE model of the US business cycle, namely the CEE model, can quantitatively account for the sacri…ce ratio and the overall adjustment dynamics after a disin ‡ation. We think such an ability is an essential requisite of an operational monetary model.
Our results show that a perfectly credible cold-turkey disin ‡ation entails a sizable and long-lasting recession in the CEE model. In addition, the values of the sacri…ce ratio are in line with those estimated in the empirical literature.
Moreover, we conduct a rigorous welfare evaluation of the costs of disin ‡ation, proposing a welfare-based sacri…ce ratio. Surprisingly enough, despite a deep and prolonged recession the short-run costs of a disin ‡ation are negligible in terms of consumption equivalent units. A disin ‡ation would actually imply miniscule welfare gains, since in the CEE model money is not superneutral (despite full indexation) and there are very small long-run welfare gains that overcome the short-run costs.
The …nding that the CEE model can replicate the main facts after a disin ‡ation is at odds with the consensus in the literature and may be good news for the New Keynesian models. But this does not mean that some of the model's features or mechanisms should not be improved to tackle the disin ‡ation question. In fact, we think that testing the CEE model with respect to disin ‡ationary policies has proved useful to shed light on important aspects for current and future research.
First, it will be important to understand how each of the di¤erent features of the CEE model quantitatively a¤ects our results. A thorough investigation of this issue is outside the scope of this paper for obvious length constraint, but it is developed in a companion paper, which focuses on the role of the monetary policy and of price indexation. Regarding monetary policy, the companion paper investigates di¤erent interest rate rules (with responses to output and to lagged interest rate), money supply rules, the role of anticipation and of gradualism, and higher sizes of disin ‡ation. Moreover, the companion paper shows how the role of price indexation would depend on the way monetary policy is implemented.
Second, the role of price indexation should be investigated further. Indexation is indeed a reduced form assumption that can act as a substitute for many other more structural phenomena. There is a macroeconomic reduced form equivalence of di¤erent microeconomic models, so that a similar e¤ect can actually come from irrational price setters (rule of thumbers), inattentive price setters or lack of credibility, and hence sluggish expectation adjustment.
Third, a Calvo time-dependent price setting model would need indexation in order not to have unpalatable long-run implications of a permanent change in in ‡ation due to the large e¤ects of price dispersion in that model. Moreover, although we look only at moderate rates of in ‡ation, for which the Calvo parameter de…ning the frequency of price adjustment can be considered constant, ideally one would like to work with a model where the changes in the average in ‡ation level induce …rms to revise their behavior 15 . In other words, a time-dependent model is particularly exposed to the
Lucas critique when used to analyze changes in the average in ‡ation rate. Last but not least, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) has recently shown that the many price adjustments occur on the intensive margin rather than on the extensive margin. Embedding what Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) Finally, our welfare results are rather surprising. The abandonment of the risk sharing assumption, together with a proper account of heterogeneity among agents regarding the impact of a recession on their welfare, may overturn our results.
Fortunately, current research and the recent contributions to the New Keynesian literature are taking up all these challenges.
Households
There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived households whose expected intertemporal utility function is given by
where E 0 de…nes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information set available at time 0, is the subjective discount factor, function u c t bc t 1 ; h 
where the parameter indicates the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of goods. The standard household problem de…nes the optimal demand of good i; given by c it = P it Pt c t ; where P t is the general price index given by
There is a continuum of labour services h jt , j 2 [0; 1], which are combined according to the following technology
where~ is the elasticity of substitutions of labour types. The standard cost minimization problem for the …rms yields the labour-speci…c demand function given by
where W jt is the wage paid to labor type j and W t is a wage in-
The total labor supply is found by integrating
Agents owns physical capital k t that depreciates at rate . The capital accumulation equation is
where the function S introduces the adjustment cost on investment and satis…es the properties that S (1) = S 0 (1) = 0; S 00 (1) > 0: The model also features variable capacity utilization of physical capital, denoted by u t ;. The cost of capital then depends on the degree of utilization and it is given by a (u t ). Agents rent capital to …rms at a real interest rate r k t and decide also over the utilization rate. There are complete markets for state contingent assets, such that all agents choose the same level of consumption.
Household …rst order conditions are hence given by
Wages are sticky à la Calvo, and 1 ~ is the probability of being able to reset wages in the next period. If wages can not be re-optimized, the CEE model assumes that wage are updated anyway according to past in ‡ation, such that: w j;t+1 = w j;t ~ t wherẽ is the degree of indexation to past in ‡ation. De…new t as the optimal wage set every period t. The union chooses the optimal wage maximizing the utility function given by equation (12), subject to the demand for labour in the speci…c market h jt = w jt wt ~ h d t and the probability of not being able to re-optimize in future periods. The resulting …rst order condition is
All the reset optimal wages are identical in all labour markets.
Firms
Each good is produced by a …rm that monopolistically supply its own variety using a production technology of the form
where z t is an aggregate technology factor common across …rms, and represents a …xed cost of production. The production function F (k it ; h it ) is well-behaved and it is the same across …rms. Final goods can be used for consumption, investment, public expenditure and to pay cost of capital utilization. Each …rm faces the following demand function
where
Firms rent capital from households on a competitive market and must pay a fraction of wages at the beginning of the period in cash. Therefore, their money demand function is
The …rms'problem is then to maximize the expected value of future pro…ts, under their demand function (23) and the cash-in-advance constraint (25). The …rst order conditions with respect to capital and labour services are
mc it z t F h it (k it ; h it ) = w t 1 + R t 1 R t :
Since F is homogeneous of degree one, equation (26) and equation (27) imply that all …rms have the same marginal costs and aggregation across …rms is straightforward.
Prices are sticky à la Calvo. Every period each …rm can choose a new price of its own good with a probability 1 . As for wages, the prices that cannot be reset optimally are likewise automatically updated according to past in ‡ation, such that: P it = P it 1 t 1 ;
where is the degree of price indexation. The …rst order condition for the optimal price 
Again, all the reset optimal prices are identical for all goods.
The government
Government expenditure is …nanced through lump-sum taxes and seigniorage
where m t denotes real money balances and t P t =P t 1 is the (gross) in ‡ation rate at time t: The government minimizes the costs of acquiring the composite good; hence given public expenditure, the government's absorption of a single type of good is g it = P it Pt g t :
To close the model we postulate that monetary policy uses the simple non-linear nominal interest rate rule as described in the paper.
Equilibrium
The model equilibrium conditions are Money market:
Labor market: h
Capital market:
Good i market: z t F (k it ; h it ) = (c t + g t + i + a (u t ) k t ) The parameters values, taken from CEE, are listed in the 
